политология
POLITICAL SCIENCE
DOI: 10.12731/wsd-2014-9.3-12 UDC 323(450+571)
POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN THE HYBRID REGIME: THE POST-SOVIET RUSSIA EXPERIENCE
Shkel S.N., Shakirova E.V.
Political development of Russia during last two decades is more often considered by researchers as transformation process from one form of the hybrid regime - defective democracy, to another one - competitive authoritarianism. Thus, political experience of Russia gives the opportunity for comparative analysis ofpolitical opposition evolution in the context of different hybrid regime types. How do regime characteristics influence the dynamics of opposition competitive opportunities? Is it possible to calculate real political opposition competitive opportunities under such conditions when electoral results are essentially slanted and cannot be evidence of real support for oppositional actors on the part of citizens? The measurement procedure of political opposition competitive opportunities by means of the index analysis is presented in this article. The proposed coding scale of opposition merits and demerits valuation considers both structural possibilities and regime incentives that determine resources distribution between government and opposition. Measuring of opposition competitive opportunities dynamics in Russia during 1993-2012 made it possible to reveal specific features of influence of various forms of the hybrid regime on oppositional actors' evolution.
Keywords: political opposition, hybrid regime, Russia, competitive authoritarianism, defective democracy, index analysis.
ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ОППОЗИЦИЯ В ГИБРИДНОМ РЕЖИМЕ: ОПЫТ ПОСТСОВЕТСКОЙ РОССИИ
Шкель С.Н., Шакирова Э.В.
Политическое развитие России последних двух десятилетий все чаще исследователями рассматривается как процесс трансформации от одной формы гибридного режима - дефектной демократии, к другой - конкурентному авторитаризму. Таким образом, политический опыт России дает возможность сравнительного анализа эволюции политической оппозиции в условиях разных гибридных режимных типов. Каким образом режимные характеристики влияют на динамику конкурентного потенциала оппозиции? Можно ли рассчитать реальный конкурентный потенциал политической оппозиции в условиях, когда электоральные результаты существенным образом искажаются и не могут в полной мере объективно свидетельствовать о реальной поддержке со стороны населения оппозиционных кандидатов? На основе анализа политического развития постсоветской России в период 1993-2012 гг. эти вопросы обсуждаются в данной статье.
Ключевые слова: политическая оппозиция, гибридный режим, Россия, конкурентный авторитаризм, дефектная демократия, индексный анализ.
Introduction
In modern democratic countries the significance of political opposition isn't disputed. In authoritarian states it is pro forma recognized but is subjected to persecution in reality. Political opposition holds a specific place in states with transient regime characteristics. Such-like regimes
are determined by researchers as "hybrid", i.e. including both democratic institutional characteristics and authoritarian attributes [4; 62; 7]. Among variety of hybrid regimes typologies worked out by modern theorists concepts of "defective democracy" [39] and "competitive" ("electoral") authoritarianism [26; 27; 55; 2] got recognized most of all. Political development of Russia during last two decades is more often considered by researchers as transformation process from one form of the hybrid regime - defective democracy, to another one - competitive authoritarianism [17]. Thus, political experience of Russia gives the opportunity for comparative analysis of political opposition evolution in the context of different hybrid regime types. How do regime characteristics influence the dynamics of opposition competitive opportunities? Is it possible to calculate real political opposition competitive opportunities under such conditions when electoral results are essentially slanted and cannot be evidence of real support for oppositional actors on the part of citizens? These issues based on the analysis of the post-Soviet Russia political development are discussed in this article.
The Dynamics Factors
of Political Opposition Competitive Opportunities
Political Opposition Competitive Opportunities (POCO) can be understood as a certain level of possibilities and resource achievements; using it opposition can not just increase chances of obtaining authority positions by means of loyalty strategy, but do it on basis of competitive rivalry. Hence, not only immediate developing of political resources by opposition, but also the factors that stimulate opposition adherence to principles, changing it from loyal quasi-opposition to disloyal opposition, can be considered the determinants contributory to increase of opposition opportunities level [28, p. 91].
Operationalization of this notion is necessary for POCO measurement. Relying on theories in modern political science, factors that influence opposition possibilities increase can be divided into two clusters: structural and
procedure-agential [38]. Structural factors are variables that greatly influence political regime dynamics, its characteristics can extend or, vice versa, reduce possibilities for opposition resources expansion. Therefore, opposition strength is composed of advantageous structural factors that can be indicated as structural possibilities (SP), political-regime incentives (RI) and resource achievements (RA). Opposition Index (OI) calculation formula can be presented in the following way:
OI=SP+RI+RA
Structural possibilities. Structural factors that influence regime changes dynamics are usually meant as such characteristics of a state and society as degree of national consolidation [53], national identity nature as far as opportunities for population mobilization based on oppositional nationalism are concerned [6; 60], predominant type of society political culture [1], government efficiency [30; 60], polity macroeconomic parameters [31]. In relation with the problem under analysis the majority of these factors matter in the long-term prospects entirely, that is why only some of them with proper interpretation are used in this research. In particular they are: polity macroeco-nomic parameters in one or another period of time, predominant social sentiment, political ranking of government and opposition, government capacity. We will reveal major theoretical ideas which point out causative interrelation between these factors and opposition possibilities.
Macroeconomics (1). Significance of economic factors in government and opposition relations is underlined by many researchers [33, p. 91-110; 21; 48]. Economic growth facilitates stable operation of government machine, retaining of power elite possibilities to politicize and capitalize state institutions, maintain overall stable politico-social situation, remove the threat of elite split and possible disloyal counter elites strategies in due time, invest resources into loyal political blueprints, form the network of patron-client relationships and contribute to marginalization of opposition. All of these factors determine power elite stability and reduces the approval level of opposition. Economic development in resource "petro-states" including modern Russia often subverts modernization effects and is able not so much to reinforce de-
mocratization as to form «resource trap of oil curse», enhancing possibilities not for opposition but for retention of authoritarian rulers' power [50; 56].
Alongside this, the idea that economic growth strengthens government does not ensue that economic downturn leads to opposition reinforcement. Not only economic slump in itself but also its duration should be taken into account. Nevertheless, crisis character is significant. As T. Pepinsky mentioned, external shocks caused by international economic fluctuations may turn out to be less dangerous for government that internal economic crisis, as long as under the conditions of exogenous factors government can shift the responsibility on to external circumstances and look "as innocent as a lamb" [45].
Social sentiment (2). This factor is connected with predominant trendlines in social sentiment that changes on scale "reforms - stability" and is recorded by means of sociological measurement [48]. Whichever trend-line is predominant and what represents it at a certain time period - government or opposition - the variable points at maximization or minimization of one or another political actor's possibilities.
Government Ranking (3). This factor is closely related with the previous two but is not confined to them. The dynamics of government ranking is easily defined on the results of regular sociological measurement carried out by leading research centers. It should be mentioned that government popularity decrease does not immediately lead to increase of opposition public support. Under decrease of power elite popularity the regime often quite efficiently applies the strategy of opposition discredit, taking away choice from society and creating the effect of "forced acceptance" of political reality, which in the eyes of society leaves much to be desired [49]. Hence, to make a valuation of this variable one should pay attention not only to government ranking but to opposition ranking as well, their trend-lines can be irrelevant. Nevertheless, government ranking decrease builds facilities for developing of opposition competitive opportunities.
Government capacity (4). By this factor we mean not only efficiency of public management but also power elite resource availability that allows it to
restrict counter elites influence, politicize public sector and turn to account its components (government-funded organizations, courts, force authorities, business, etc.). According to Greene and Way's conclusions [21; 60] it may be stated that government capacity decrease is in direct pr
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